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The instant action is an appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission's ("Commission")
16, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lavi and Order,
Claimant/Appellant, Enrique Lopez ("Lopez"), is not entitled to

concluding that
additional "pennanent

impainnent benefits" related to his binaural hearing loss caused by the industrial accident. The
Comi is asked to determine whether the Commission properly calculated Lopez's disability
benefits for binaural hearing loss.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The instant action was submitted, for Title 72 deliberation on stipulated exhibits and
issues, to Industrial Commission Referee Alan Taylor, and taken under advisement on December
23, 2015. Referee Taylor issued Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
March 25, 2016. The Industrial Commission did not adopt Referee Taylor's Recommendations
and issued its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order ("Findings and Order") on
April 14, 2016.
The Industrial Commission concluded that: Lopez proved that his left and right ear
hearing impainnents are related to the industrial accident; the proper method for calculating
Lopez's binaural hearing loss is reliance upon "a credible medical appraisal" of the "overall
percentage" of binaural hearing loss sustained; Lopez suffers "pennanent impainnent of 8%" of
the whole person as a result of such binaural hearing loss; and that Defendants/Respondents
("Employer" or ''Surety") previously paid 8% ''pennanent impainnent benefits" for Lopez's
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Lopez timely filed this Appeal on

3, 2016.

of Facts

Claimant/Appellant, Enrique Lopez ("Lopez") was injured, while in

course and scope

of his employment with Defendants.lRespondents ("Employer" or "Surety"), on August 26, 2011,
as the result of being hit and/or trampled by a bull. Upon being discovered unconscious in the
pen, Lopez was transported to St. Benedict's Hospital Emergency Room

Jerome, Idaho, where

he was treated by Dr. Thomas Zepeda for various injuries, including, left knee pain, a cut on his
head and decreased hearing. See, Hearing Ex. A, pgs. 3-4. Lopez followed up with William
Jacobs, P.A., at Jerome Family Clinic for assessment of various conditions, including "hearing
dysfunction." Hr'g Ex. A, pg. 6. Employer accepted Lopez's claim and provided commensurate
workers compensation benefits.
Peter Doble, M.D., of Trinity Ear, Nose and Throat, and A. Joseph Seitz, AuD., of South
Idaho Hearing & Audiology, subsequently tested and treated Lopez for his work-related hearing
loss. See generally, Hr'g Exs. D and E. Through a February 13, 2012, letter to Surety, Dr. Seitz
diagnosed Lopez as suffering "a profound hearing loss," with "mild high frequency loss in the
left ear and profound hearing loss in the right ear. No speech reception threshold was available
for the right ear," and recommended a "pmver behind-the-ear hearing aid for the right ear."
Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 28. Dr. Seitz perforn1ed an ''Audiologic Evaluation" of Lopez on March 29,
2012, and generated a companion report.
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from the Surety's In-House Medical Consultant, Dr. Paul Collins, Dr. Seitz generated
an April l 0, 201

correspondence therein setting fmih "The I

hearing loss only." Id. at pg. 31.

impainnent rating was for

Subsequently, for unknovm reasons, Dr. Seitz authored a

follow-up May 14, 2012, letter to Dr. Collins, reiterating "The 18% hearing impainnent is based
on a profound hearing loss on the right ear and a mild high-frequency loss on the left ear." Id. at
pg. 32.
On November 19, 201

Greg Schroeder, BC-HIS, of Hearing Aid Counselors &

Audiology, tested Lopez's left and right ear hearing loss, with results set forth in a November 19,
2012, "Appointment Summary." Hr'g Ex. F, pgs. 33-34. In a February 1, 2013, letter to Surety,
Mr. Schroeder recommended the "Phonak bi-cross system" to address Lopez's hearing loss, as
the "behind the car" hearing aid resulted in "no improved hearing." Id. at pg. 35.

In a June 10, 2013, letter to Lopez's counsel, Christine Pickup, AuD., of Hearing Aid
Counselors & Audiology, noted that per prior testing, Lopez "had no speech audiometry
responses in his right ear, another indication that there was no usable hearing in the right ear"
and "a mild high-frequency loss in the left ear." Hr'g Ex. G, pg. 36. Dr. Pickup recommended a
"BiCROS (Bilateral Contralateral Routing of Signal) hearing aid" to facilitate "infonnation
coming to the right side of his head, and also help with the hearing loss he has on the left side."

Id. at pg. 36. Per the Sixth Edition AMA Permanent Impairment Guides, Dr. Pickup opined that
Lopez "has a I 00% hearing impainnent for monaural hearing loss."
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Id. at pg. 3 7.

s

a
November 17, 2013, letter containing answers to Surety's inquiries. Hr'g Ex.

a

pg. 38. Dr.

Maughan "agree[ d] with the recommendation for the BICROS hearing aid. It is the best

to

treat this type of hearing loss." Id. at pg. 37. Dr. Maughan concluded that Lopez "sustained a
unilateral total hearing loss (right) secondary to the closed heard injury sustained 8/26/2011" and
"left ear high frequency neurosensory hearing Joss." Id. Without a pre-injury audiogram, Dr.
Maughan "cannot exclude the head injury as the cause of the left ear loss ... "

Id. Utilizing the

Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides to Evaluation of Physical Impairment, Dr. Maughn medically

assessed Lopez with "a 100% monaural impainnent of his right ear and a 7.5% monaural
impainnent of his left ear." Dr. Maughn then proceeded to "calculate[ ]"

22.9% binaural

impainnent which is rated as an 8% impainnent of the whole person." Id.
Through an October

2013, "Notification," Surety authorized the BICROS hearing aid

and commenced payment of the "8% permanent partial impainnent of the whole person due to
your bilateral hearing loss." Hr'g Ex. I, pg. 43. Subsequently, Lopez, by and through his legal
counsel, requested that Surety pay for his undisputed binaural hearing loss in accord with LC. §
72-428. Surety declined, opting to pay the lesser amount Dr. Maughn "calculated" per the Six
Edition AMA Guides to Evaluation of Physical lrnpairment.
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\-Vhether the Industrial Commission Properly Calculated
Amount of
Claimant's/Appellant's Income Benefits for Binaural Hearing Loss?

In an attempt to forestall any confusion,

asserts that, with respect to the instant

Appeal, he is simply seeking the Court's clarification as to his full measure of income benefits
for binaural hearing loss, based upon the appropriate disability rating, as mandated by the Act
and related judicial interpretation. To that end, apologies are made to the Court in the event that
improper terminology is, or was, used in this case with respect to "impairment," "disability,"
"income benefits" or the interplay thereof.

The Court provided straightforward guidance in

setting forth "[T]he forerunner of Idaho Code section 72-428 was enacted in 1917, and since that
time the Idaho Code has always refe1Ted to a disability award, not and impainnent award," and "
... Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Law only provides for an award of income benefits based
on disability, not impairment" Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 2016 Opinion No. 37, *5, n. l
(March 24, 2016) 1 ( citations omitted) (quotations original).
Even though the Court's initial Jl1ayer opinion was issued before the Commission's April
14, 2016, Findings and Order

this ease, the Commission opted for ongoing reliance on their

own administrative Mayer "precedent," rather than the Court's directives as set fmih in the same

1

The Court's Substitute Opinions contains the exact same admonitions. l\Jayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 2016
Opinion No. 53, *5, n. l (Substitute Opinion May 3, 2016)
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111

income benefits
the payments are intended for what

to the statute are for 'pennanent disability'
can only

described as

(citation omitted).
Commission's

impairment. 3 '

R.,

34-36.

(quotations original)

This administrative reluctance is seemmgly demonstrated by the
upon referring to Lopez's income benefits disability m;vard in tenns of

"pennanent impairment benefits" and "additional permanent impainnent benefits," etc. R., pg.
l 6. Frankly, these administrative contentions, juxtaposed with the Court's directives in Mayer,
only serve to fm1her interject confusion with respect to proper usage of the tenns "impaim1ent,"
and "disability," which will invariably result in inadve1ient transpositions in this Appeal.
The Court is presented with two options in the instant Appeal. First, Lopez's income
benefits can be detennined, via application of straightforward mathematical calculations to an
explicitly named pennanent injury, i.e. "pm1ial loss of binaural hearing," in accord with the
provisions of the Act and commensurate judicial interpretation. This approach operates to satisfy
the overriding "simple," "summary," "humane," as well as "liberal" statutory construction to
"enhance economical rehabilitation" requisites of the Act. Steinebach v. Hoff Lumber Co., 98
Idaho 428, 431, 566 P .2d 377 ( 1977).
Alternatively, the Commission devised a hybrid calculation methodology premised upon

2

JI.fayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 2015 UC 0031, 2015 WL 4994298 (2015).
'The Court appears to have rejected a nearly identical contention of "the words disability and impairment must
mean the same thing and the statute [§72-428] must really be referring to impairment ratings. not disability ratings,"
in 1Yfayer. Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 2016 Opinion No. 37, *9 (March 24, 2016) (italics original); Mayer v.
TPC Holdings, Inc., 2016 Opinion No. 53, *9 (Substitute Opinion May 3, 2016) (italics original).
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"

serves to

injured \VOrkers, with binaural hearing loss,

their full, rightful measure of

as specifically allotted by the Legislature, thereby arguably violating
fundamental tenets of the Act.

The Idaho \Yorkers' Compensation Act Provides the Exclusive Means for
Calculating Lopez's Disability Income Benefits for Binaural Hearing Loss.
The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act is a "purely statutory scheme." Corgatelli v. Steel

West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 1155 (2014).

"[I]nterpretation of the workers'

compensation statutes is a question oflaw ... " City of Boise v. Industrial Comm 'n, 129 Idaho
906, 909, 935 P.2d 169 (1997). The worker's compensation law is to be liberally construed in
favor of the claimant in order to effect the object of the law and to promote justice. Haldiman v.

American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d 187 (1990) (citations omitted). 'If the
statutory language is unambiguous, we need not engage in statutory construction and are free to
apply the statute's plain meaning.' Nelson v. City of Bonners Ferry, 149 Idaho 29, 31, 232 P.3d
808 (2010) (quoting Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,847,216 P.3d 130 (2009)).
I
I
I
I
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must
of the Idaho Workers'

mcome

must be

Idaho

("Act"). The provisions of
favor of the employees in

order to serve the humane purposes for which it was promulgated." Wernecke v. St. Maries

401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1

1013 (2009) ( citations omitted). The

humane purposes \vhich the Act serves, leaves no room for narrow, technical construction.

Reese v.

Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630, 633, 115 P.3d 721 (2005). "Doubtful cases should be

resolved in favor of the worker who has been injured." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695,
698, 769 P.2d 572 (1989) (citation omitted). After achieving maximal medical rehabilitation,
"The employee receives a rating for the pennanent impainnent set in terms of a percentage of the
whole man, and
guidelines."

employee's compensation is calculated pursuant to the statutory

Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 1154 (2014)

(emphasis added).

"[T]he legislature intended benefits for partial pennanent disability to be

fixed and quantifiable." Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109,116,686 P.2d
54 (1984). The Legislature deliberately created and named the injury of "partial loss of binaural
hearing," and as such, the Act is dispositive in providing the disability income benefits for
Lopez's work-related binaural hearing loss.
Specifically, the Act sets forth, in pertinent part:
72-428. Scheduled income benefits for loss or losses of use of bodily members An employee who suffers a permanent disability less than total and pennanent shall,
in addition to the income benefits payable during the period of recovery, be paid
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********************************
(3) Loss of Vision and Hearing

********************************
Total loss of

********************************
or partial loss of use. Income benefits payable for permanent partial
(5) Partial
partial loss or loss of use of a member shall not
disability attributable to
partial
to
for a period as the permanent
loss or loss of use of the member bears to total loss of the member.
J.C. § 72-428 ( emphasis original) (emphasis added).

As such, with respect to the statutorily

"enumerated" injury of "loss of binaural hearing," the explicit language of the Act mandates
"income benefits" for both "total" and "partial'' loss.
In conjunction with l.C. § 72-428, the Act also plainly dictates coverage for:

72-429. Unscheduled permanent disabilities. - In all other cases of pennanent
disabilities less than total not included in the foregoing schedule the amount of
income benefits shall be not less than the evaluation in relation to the percentages
of loss of the members, or loss of the whole man, stated against the scheduled
permanent impairments as the disabilities bear to those produced by the pennanent
impainnents named in the schedule ...
LC. § 72-429 (emphasis original) (emphasis added). "I.C. § 72-429 is a companion provision to
I.C. § 72-428 and provides for the measurement of benefits for pennanent disabilities not

scheduled under I.C. § 72-428." Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho at 116.
The Court concisely articulated the interrelationship between prior incarnations of§ 72-428 and
§ 72-429 as:
The 193 7 amendment provides for a method of computation of specific
indemnity for an pennanent injuries less than total caused by accident arising out
of and in the course of employment, whether actual or comparable losses of
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v. J.

, 83 Idaho 120, 1

, 358 P.2d 587 (1961)

Notably, the Legislature implicitly declared that "partial loss of binaural hearing" falls
with the parameters of I.C. § 72-429, by specifically designating/naming it as an
4
pennanent injur[y] less than total ."

I.C. § 72-430(2) (emphasis added).

In !Mayer, it was

explained:
In Idaho Code section 72-428, there is no difference between a scheduled injury
or a scheduled pennanent impairment. The 1971 legislation defined 'permanent
impainnent' as 'any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after maximal
medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which abnonnality or loss,
medically, is considered stable or nonprogressive at the time of evaluation.' Id. at
455. The loss of the listed body parts, eyesight, or hearing would constitute
pennanent impainnents under that definition.

Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 2016 Opinion No. 53, *11 (Eismann, J., specially concurring)
(quotations original) (emphasis added); LC. § 72-422.
Moreover, while omitted from the Commission's April 14, 2016, Findings and Order, the
Commission's own administrative regulations reaffinn the controlling nature of J.C. § 72-428,
with respect to calculating unscheduled injuries/impainnents.

Administrative regulations are

subject to the principles of statutory construction. 11/ason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 586,
21 P.3d 903 (2001). Particularly, the Commission's Rule, governing conversion of impainnent
ratings, reveals the relevant administratively adopted "Schedule," in setting forth:

4

Significantly, "partial loss of binaural hearing" is one of only two unscheduled permanent injuries.1impairments
expressly enumerated/named by the Legislature. J.C. 9 72-430(2).
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1.01

word

m a

IS

mandatory." Gilbert v. Moore, I 08 Idaho 165, 169, 697 P.2d 1179 (1985) (citation omitted). As
it is indisputable that, in compliance with unambiguous Legislative mandates, the
Commission's own singular, administrative default "Schedule" for calculating unscheduled
injuries/impairments is an '·exact percentage" "converted" from I.C. § 72-428. Again, given the
enumerated § 72-428(3) "Total loss of binaural hearing" schedule, a "conversion" of Lopez's §
72-430(2) legislatively named "pmiial loss of binaural hearing" is a simple, direct mathematical
calculation.
In other instances of unenumerated/unnamed "unscheduled pennanent impainnents," the
Idaho Supreme Court instructed:
[W]e note that the impainnent attributable to an injured and replaced hip is not
among the "scheduled pennanent impainnents" enumerated in J.C. § 72-428.
Rather, it is an unscheduled impairment, to be determined by analogy to the
statutory schedule. This analogizing process is sufficiently flexible to recognize
that a painful hip may produce greater functional loss than would an asymptomatic
hip.
UnJ' v. Walker, 115 Idaho 750,756,769 P.2d 1122 (1989) (italics original) (emphasis added).

Thus, the Act, as interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court, requires detennination of "unnamed"
"unscheduled pennanent impainnents" by direct "analogy" to the J.C. § 72-428 statutory
schedule. Notably, that same year, the Court described the precise mathematical application of
the § 72-428 statutory schedule "analogizing process" in another case involving an injured hip.
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912,

15

1

119

to

was
once
Legislature's

"

"analogizing

per the,

of binaural hearing" as

§ 72-430(2) designation/naming of

an "unscheduled" injury/impairment, simply requires an uncomplicated mathematical conversion
of the "enumerated" LC. § 72-428(3) "Total loss of binaural hearing" disability schedule.
The

Legislature

specifically

listed

''Total

loss

of binaural

injury/impainnent controlled by the LC. § 72-428 disability schedule.

hearing"

as

an

Moreover, LC. § 72-

428(5) explicitly encompasses the "pmiial" loss of enumerated disabilities. Further, the Act and
judicial interpretation thereof, prescribes that

l.C. § 72-429, "unscheduled permanent

disabilities" must be calculated against the "pennanent impainnents named" in J.C. § 72-428.
Moreover, the Legislature specifically designated/named "partial loss of binaural hearing" as an
''unscheduled permanent injur[y]" in § 72-430(2).

Additionally, the Commission's default

"Schedule" for calculating unscheduled injuries/impainnents is direct conversion from the LC. §
72-428 schedules. Finally, the Urry-Horton "analogizing process" similarly mandates a direct
mathematical conversion of the I.C. § 72-428 schedules.

As such, the Act unambiguously

mandates the "method of computation" for detennining Lopez's disability income benefits for
pem1anent, partial loss of binaural hearing. Therefore, Lopez's partial binaural hearing loss must
be calculated as a direct conversion of the I.C. § 72-428(3) "Total loss of binaural hearing"
disability schedule.

I
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are

"

disability to be
, 107 Idaho 109, 116 (emphasis

v.

"[W]e are required to

to the statutory and case law of this jurisdiction that the workmen's compensation law
shall be liberally construed in favor of the injured workman and so as to

the physical

and economical rehabilitation." Steinebach v. Hojf'Lumber Co., 98 Idaho 428, 431, 566 P.2d
3 77 ( 1977) (emphasis added). The Court "frequently construe[ s] statutes in a manner that favors
the award of benefits." Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 957, 793 P.2d 187
( 1990).

As set forth infra, Lopez's entitlement to disability income benefits for partial binaural

hearing loss, is a fixed and quantifiable matter of straightforward mathematical computation.
As previously cited, the Court provided instruction as to such quantifiable calculations in

Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 115 Idaho 912, 772 P.2d 119 (1989). In deliberation of a
hip injury, the Court addressed a doctor's whole person impainnent conversion miscalculation
for a 50% leg impairment.

To that end, the Comi instructed "Pursuant to I.C. § 72-428 the 50

percent of the whole leg rating was actually equivalent to only 20 percent of the whole person."

Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 115 Idaho 912, 915. The Court's underlying calculations
are readily reproducible as a matter of straightforward mathematics. Specifically, under § 72428 the schedule for loss of a leg ("disarticulation at hip joint") is 200 \veeks.

I.C. § 72-428( 1).

The 200 weeks of compensation constitutes a 40% whole person impainnent (200 leg
amputation weeks

-c-

500 whole person weeks). Thus, as a matter of basic math, dictated by§ 72-
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15

to a
at 915.

" is 17 5
3

constitutes

The l 7 5 weeks

of

whole person impainnent for both ears (175 hearing loss weeks

As a matter of rudimentary computation,

"Total loss

LC.§

foregoing

7

500 whole person weeks).

total loss for each respective ear is 1

% (35%

7

2). As such, Lopez's 100% right ear hearing loss calculates to 17.5% \Vhole person impairment
and/or 87.50 weeks (.175 x 500). Additionally, Lopez's 7.5% left ear hearing loss calculates to
1.3% (17.5 x .075) whole person impainnent and/or 6.56 weeks (.013 x 500). Thus, in accord
with the mandatory judicial and legislative "method of computation," Lopez's income benefits,
amount to 18.8% (17.5% right ear+ 1
5
equating to a $33,398.20 disability

left car) whole person, and/or 94 weeks (.188 x 500),
benefits award.

A fixed mathematical calculation per the "total loss" scheduled mandates of l.C. § 72-428
converts Lopez's bilateral hearing loss to 18.8% whole person impainnent, equating to
$33,398.20. Thus,

Commission's reliance upon a non-statutory disability fonnula to reaffim1

an "8% permanent impainncnt of the whole person" for a "monetary award of S 14,212.00,"
contravenes controlling Idaho law and constitutes a significant ultra vires devaluation of Lopez's
benefits.

binaural hearing loss disability

94 weeks x $355.30 (55% Average State Wage)= $33,398.20

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF,

14

R., pg. 15.

Therefore,

to the

§

8
mcome

to an

''[T]he statute and decisions of our State" are "controlling" on the issue of indemnity for
a 'non-scheduled injury.' Estate o.f Peterson v. J.R. Simplot Co., 83 Idaho 120, 123. [W]e are
not at liberty to disregard the plain language of the Idaho Code ... " Stringer v. Robinson, 155
Idaho 554, 556, 314 P .3d 609 (2013 ). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no
occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation." State of

Idaho v. Brooks,

Idaho~' 341 P.3d 1259, 1261 (Ct. App. 2014).

''[I]t is ... not for this

Court to fabricate new laws where explicit statutory directives already exist." Petl}' v. Spaulding

Drywan, 117 Idaho 382, 384, 788 P.2d 197 (1990). "[W]e have held that \Ve cannot inse1i into
statutes tem1s or provisions which are obviously not there ... "

re Chcmey, 126 Idaho 554,

558, 887 P .2d 1061 ( 1995). Moreover, reading the statute as a whole reveals the intent of the
legislature as expressed through the plain language." State of Idaho v. Brooks,
341 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Ct. App. 2014).

Idaho

Plain statutory language allays consideration of

"alternative arguments." State v. Brooks, 341 P .3d at 1261.
In keeping with the dictates of controlling Idaho la\v, such as those set forth in Paulson

v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 903, 591 P.2d 143 (1979), the Commission has

- $14,212.00

$19,186.20. Hearing Ex. I, pg. 43.
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15

IS

,2011 IIC0063.1,

IS

On,; 1 4 ('7011\j
V\,..}J.

,:_

... ");

2010 IIC 0258.1, 0258.5 (1990) ("Where an impainnent is

v.

to the statute over the

the

Idaho Code § 72-

in this case

assessment would be

.L

'').

the

Guides are,

at best, merely an "advisory" tool of convenience that the Commission can choose to utilize,
under delineated circumstances, when calculation of disability compensation is not otherwise
preempted by the Act, or otherwise outside of the Commission's discretion.

Blancher v.

Louisiana Pac(fic C017J., 1993 IIC 0838.1, 0838.8 (1993) ("Physicians' impairment ratings (like

the AMA Guides themselves) arc advisory and the Commission is not bound by them.").
1.

The Legislature limited the Commission's discretion to calculate Lopez's
partial biuaural hearing loss disability income benefits.

The Commission exceeded its discretion and/or jurisdiction in assessing Lopez's
disability income benefits for paiiial binaural hearing loss. 'The Industrial Commission, as '[ aJn
administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and authority granted to it by
the Legislature and may not exercise its sub-legislative pmvers to modify, alter, or enlarge the
legislative act which it administers."' Simpson v. Louisiana-Pac(fic Co1p., 134 Idaho 109, 212,
998 P.2d 1122 (2000) (emphasis added) (quotations original) (citing, Welch v. Del Monte C01p.,
128 Idaho 513, 514, 915 P.2d 1371 (1996)). "Accordingly, the Commission exercises only that
discretion granted by the Legislature." Simpson v. Louisiana-Pac(fic C01p., 134 Idaho at 212.
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above,
/"T
\

'

§§ 72-428, 429 and 430

plain

as a whole, provides

§

exclusive, direct

means

Legislature authorized the Commission to calculate an injured worker's disability income
benefits

pai1ial loss of binaural hearing.

The Com1

this method

decisions like

Horton. To that end, the Legislature's specific § 72~430(2) designation of "partial loss of

binaural hearing" as an "unscheduled" injury/impainnent, simply requires, an uncomplicated
mathematical conversion of the "enumerated" I.C. § 72-428(3) "Total loss of binaural hearing"
disability schedule.
Second, the Legislature unambiguously provided the Commission with a single
administrative alternative, available through the fonnal rule-making process of:
(2) Preparation of schedules - Availability for inspection - Prima facie
evidence. The commission may prepare, adopt and from time to time amend a
schedule for the determination of the percentages of unscheduled pennanent
injuries less than total, including but not limited to, a schedule for partial loss of
binaural hearing ... and methods for detennination thereof. Such schedule shall
be available for public inspection, and without forn1al introduction in evidence
shall be prima facie evidence of the percentages of pennanent disabilities to be
attributed to the injuries or diseases covered by the schedule.
LC. § 72-430(2). In this case, the Commission acknowledges that "The Commission has adopted
no present schedule for determination of percentages of unscheduled impainnent for partial loss
of binaural hearing."

R., pg. 11, n.6.

Regrettably, even with this acknowledgement, the

Commission failed to account for the reality that it actually adopted a default "Industrial
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even
"Industrial Commission Schedule,"
must be calculated

unscheduled
LC. § 72-428 et. al.

accord vvith the

method.
Notably, the Act is wholly devoid of any

grant of discretion providing that

in the event the Commission did not avail itself of the § 72-430(2) schedule option, it is free to

sua sponte administratively formulate, defer or adopt an alternative hearing loss disability
computation method, of its own independent choosing.

Any contrary contention would

ostensibly render § 72-428 et. al. and § 72-430(2) superfluous. State of Idaho v. Brooks,
Idaho

341 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[W]e cannot interpret a statute in such a way

that renders any part void, superfluous, or redundant."). Unfortunately, as addressed infj-a, that is
exactly vvhat transpired in this case.
The Legislature intentionally named the unscheduled pennanent injury/impairment of
"partial loss of binaural hearing" and explicitly limited the Commission's discretion for
calculating resultant disability income benefits to two methods.

First, the Commission is

compelled to calculate "partial loss of binaural hearing" in accord with the plain statutory
language of I.C. § 72-428, 429 and 430. Identical to this mandatory statutory methodology, the
Commission's own default "Industrial Commission Schedule," similarly mandates conversion of
unscheduled injuries/impainnents, such as "partial loss of binaural hearing," in accordance with
LC. § 72-428. Second, LC. § 72-430(2) affords the Commission discretion to fonnally adopt a

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Page 18

" It is
not

to

discretion was strictly limited, both by

hearing" schedule. Thus, in this case, the
its own

Legislative

to

Lopez's disability income

benefits for partial loss of binaural hearing in accord with the mandatory I.C. §§ 72-428 et. al.
methodology. The Commission's April l

2016, Findings

Order clearly reveals that it did

not calculate Lopez's "pai1ial loss of binaural hearing" income benefits in accord with the
mandatory LC. §§ 72-428 et. al. methodology, but rather opted to construct an alternative
formula, through incorporation of the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, for an "appraisal of the
overall percentage of binaural hearing loss sustained .

R., pg, 16 (emphasis added).

Therefore, the Commission breached its legislatively constrained discretion, resulting in
significant miscalculation and devaluation of Lopez's actual disability income benefits for pai1ial
loss of binaural hearing.
2.

Utilization of the AMA Guides "Combined Values ChartM" for
assessment of binaural hearing lo:-;s disability violates the Act.

The AMA Guides "Combined Values Chart" and equivalents thereof, cannot be used to
calculate Lopez's disability income benefits for the named impainnent of "partial binaural
hearing loss." The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act and "decisions of our State" control the
issue of indemnity benefits for a 'non-scheduled injury.' Estate of Peterson v. J.R. Simplot Co.,
83 Idaho 120, 123, 358 P.2d 587 (1961) (quotations original). 'Thus it is clear that specific
indemnity for pennanent injury less than total must be paid without limitation or condition 'in
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at

to

with the disability

are wholly

Values
prov1s10ns

benefit calculation

§ 72-428 et. al.

It is indisputable that Dr. Maughn arrived at the "22.9% overall" and "8% impairment of

the whole person" figures by
tables

7

,"

of \vhat has been described as "the

contained in the AMA Guides, commonly referred to as "Combined Values Chart(s)."

AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impainnent (6th ed. 2008), at 252-54. The Guides
themselves explain the deliberate, devaluing, credit off-set component of the "Combined Values
Chart(s)" as:

1.4 Philosophy and Use of the Combined Values Chart
... A standard formula was used to ensure that regardless of the number of
impairments, the summary value would not exceed 100% of the whole person.
According to the formula listed in the combined values chart, multiple
impairments are combined so that the whole person impairment is equal to or
less than the sum of the individual impainnent values.
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Pennanent Impainnent ( 5th ed. 200 I), at 9 (emphasis original)
(emphasis added).

As such, the AMA Guides "Combined Values Chart(s)" is a fonnula

specifically designed to devalue an injured worker's impainnents. The practical effects of the
AMA Guides "Combined Values Chart" are succinctly and aptly explained as:
Combining impainncnt ratings always results in a lower figure than merely
adding the ratings. This is because the combined values chard uses the following
fonnula: A B (1 A) the combined value of A and B, where A and B are
decimal equivalents of percentage ratings. The combined values chart has been

7

Norwood v. Lee JVay A,fotor Freight,
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646 P .2d 2, 5 (Okla.App.Div.2 1982).
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a "standard," devaluing formula directly contravenes the Act.
Initially, the provisions of

§ 72-428 et. al. do not contain even an indieia of

Legislative authority for a credit-offset mechanism, wherein an injured ,vorker's impairment(s)
should, or even can, be "combined" for a value less than the sum of the individual impain11ent
values.

When presented with a similar type of devaluation/credit-offset assertion, the Court

resoundingly rebuffed:
An analysis of the entire schedule of indemnities, as contained in [prior statutory
incarnation], leads us to the conclusion that it was the intention of the legislature
to grant the indemnity.for each specific injwy there enumerated and comparable
indemnities for other cases not enumerated in the statute; and that each indemnity
was intended to be separate and independent from every other indemnity ... all
of which leads to the conclusion that it was not intended that credit:.., should be
made for the later indemnities where a larger one is subsequently awarded.
v. General Construction Co., 61 Idaho 689,694, 106 P.2d 1007 (1940) (italics original)
( emphasis added).

Under a subsequent statutory incarnation, the Court reaffirmed "[Then

follows the schedule of bodily members and evaluation of each in weeks of compensation to be
paid for loss of each member.] Hix v. Potlach Forests,

, 88 Idaho 155, 157, 397 P.2d 237

(1964) (emphasis added) (declining an injured ,vorker's plea to allow benefits beyond the
"schedules of specific indemnity."). Remarkably, in "[e]xamining worker's compensation law as
a whole," the Court recently reaffinned that "As a purely statutory scheme, the Court carmot

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, Page 21

a

be paid for

that an
,vithout

Supreme Court

separately

credit off-set "limitation or

Idaho's long-standing mandate for payment of each and every

injury/indemnity without an artificial devaluation "limitation or condition," is even consistent
with some other jurisdictions that have actually adopted the AMA Guides.

In addressing an

analogous "combined values" assertions, an Oklahoma Appellate Court dctennined that "[t]hese
labrynthian calculations and attendant arguments ably demonstrate the need for clarification of
the recently adopted workers compensation rules relative to the AMA Guides." Norwood v. Lee

Way ft1otor Freight, Inc., 646 P.2d 2, 4 (Okla.App.Div.2 1982). "Within the limitations oflogic
and experience," the Oklahoma Comi clarified:
Prior to adoption of the AMA Guides, Claimant's two injuries would have been
added together to arrive at his total disability rating. However, for reasons
which we cannot logically fathom, the two injuries, when combined according to
the Guides, are worth less to Claimant than the same two injuries would have
been if incurred in separate accidents, which we find to be an illogical result.
We can imagine multiple injuries which, in combination may create more
disability to a claimant than the sum of the constituent disabilities. However, we
cannot imagine injuries in combination with each other which decrease a
claimant's overall disability.
*********

However, if the system is indeed valid and objective the constituent rating
of a single disability should not be diminished by the findings of a separately
identifiable disability. At a minimum the separate ratings should be additive
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*

**

******
sum

no case
as suggested by Insuror.
v. Lee Way

, 646 P.2d

4

6. As pointed out by the Norwood

Comi, the sobering reality in this instance is that had Lopez injured the hearing in his respective
ears in two separate accidents, it is unarguable under the Act, as well as judicial interpretations
such as Close and Horton, that he would have received indemnity benefits for each injury,
separate and independent from the other, \Vithout the "limitation or condition" of a credit off-set.
Similarly, in Redd v. Kansas Truck Center, 239 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2010), the Supreme Court
of Kansas addressed a surety's argument that separate injuries should be combined into a single
whole body impairment per the AMA Guides.

The Kansas Supreme Comi considered the

surety's arguments "in light of the consideration given to the Guides by the legislature when it
included reference to them in statutes," and determined:
But, if the entire instructions contained in the Guides are to be applied to create a
whole body impaim1ent for every injury to a worker, as [Surety] argues they
should be, the statute's scheduled injury section in [Kansas Code] become
meaningless. Statutory construction rules do not favor this result.

* ** **** ** *
But since the Kansas Legislature created its own mechanism to calculate
pennanent partial disability awards in [Kansas Code] the more reasonable
interpretation for [Kansas Code] is that the legislature meant to adopt the
evaluation requirements but not the instructions to combine and conve1i the
injuries into whole body impairments.
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over

not

more

* *********
Using the statutory construction analysis recited above, we hold the best
way to reconcile [Kansas Code] with the statutory schedule is to use the Guides as
a mechanism to evaluate impairment at the level of the injury and to not apply its
provision that call for combining injuries first into regional, and then whole body
awards should be provided at each injury level.
impainnents. As such,

Redd v. Kansas Truck Center, 239 P.3d 66, 78 - 82 (Kan. 2010) (emphasis added). As with
Kansas, though I.C. § 72-428 et. al., the Idaho Legislature created its own statutory mechanism
to calculate pennanent, partial disability awards.

Similarly, if, in every instance wherein a

worker suffers more than one injury in a single work-related accident, the Commission could
simply opt to ignore controlling Idaho law in favor of the non-statutory, advisory-only AMA,
Guides, the Act's scheduled injury section would be rendered meaningless. Finally, distinct from
Kansas, there is absolutely no need to reconcile the permanent partial disability provisions of the
Idaho Workers' Compensation Act \Vith the non-statutory, unadopted, advisory-only AMA
Guides.

The Legislature created its own statutory mechanism for calculating disability income
benefits for each and every unscheduled pennanent, partial injury/impainnent. The provisions of
LC. § 72-428 et. al. do not contain any express Legislative authority for a credit-offset, wherein

an injured worker's impainnent(s) should, or even can, be "combined" for a value less than the
sum of the individual impainnent values. Further, the
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of Idaho

long-affinned

from
"limitation or condition."
Values

Guides "Combined

Moreover, the declared purpose of the

s impairments, without

fonnula is to artificially devalue an injured

regard for controlling Legislative mandates.

To that end, the Idaho Legislature has never

incarnation of

AMA Guides for purposes of calculating, nor

adopted, nor incorporated

''combining" such disability income benefits. As such, the AMA Guides "Combined Values"
formulas directly contravene the Act and judicial interpretation thereof. Thus, the Commission
was precluded from using Dr. Maughn's "overall" 22.9% or "8% impainnent of the whole
person" AMA Guides combined values calculations in its assessment of Lopez's disability
income benefits for pennanent, pmiial loss of binaural hearing.

Therefore, pursuant to the

controlling LC. § 72-428 et. al. statutory impainnent schedule as interpreted by the Court, Lopez
is entitled to an I 8.8% whole person disability income benefits award.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In consideration of the foregoing argument and authority, Lopez respectfully requests that
the Court rule: that the Commission did not properly calculate Lopez's disability income benefits
for pennanent, partial loss of binaural hearing; that Lopez proved entitlement to additional
disability income benefits for pennanent, partial binaural hearing loss; that Lopez is entitled to
18.8% disability income benefits for pennanent, partial binaural hearing loss; and remand for
proceedings consistent therewith.
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